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CASENOTE
The Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony: Rock v.
Arkansas' — Criminal defendants throughout the country are
undergoing hypnosis in the hope of uncovering exculpatory infor-
mation.) I n addition, witnesses and victims of crimes are undergoing
hypnosis to enhance their memories so that they may serve as
eyewitnesses in court. 3
 Although medical experts agree that there
is no single, accepted definition of hypnosis,'t it is generally defined.
as an artificially induced, sleeplike or trancelike condition in which
a person is extremely responsive to suggestions made from the
hypnotist.`' Testimony that a witness is unable to recall prior to
undergoing hypnosis, but can recall after undergoing hypnosis, is
known as "hypnotically refreshed" testimony.''
Courts have adopted three approaches regarding the admissi-
bility of hypnotically refreshed testimony: per se admissibility; 7 qual-
ified admissibility conditioned upon an adherence to procedural
safeguards;S and per se inadmissibility.• The per se admissibility ap-
proach permits a trier of fact to determine the weight of hypnoti-
107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
2 See Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE; AN ANNUAL
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 62 (M. Tonry & N. Morris eds. 1981) [hereinafter Use and Misuse).
See id.; P. GIANNELLI & E. INWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 345 (1986).
4 1'. GIANNELLI & E. IsoNiNiosurtED, supra note 3, at 346-47; see Diamond, Inherent Problems
in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 313, 316-17 (1980).
5
 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 648 (New College Ed. 1978); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 668 (5th ed. 1979); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 678 (5th Unabridged
Lawyer's Ed. 1982). The American Medical Association has defined hypnosis as:
A (empty:try condition of altered attention in the subject which may be induced
by another person and in which a variety of phenomena may appear sponta-
neously or in response to verbal or other stimuli. These phenomena include
alterations in consciousness and memory, increased susceptibility to suggestion',
and the production in the subject of responses and ideas unfamiliar to him in
his usual state of mind.
Council on Mental Health, Medical Use of Hypnosis, 168 J. A.M.A. 186, 187 (1958).
"See, e.g., Orne, Hypnotically Induced Testimony, in EvEwiTNEss TESTIMONY: PSYCH01.061-
CAL PERSPECTIVES 171-72 (C. Wells & E. Loftus eds. 1984) [hereinafter Hypnotically Induced
Testimony]; State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 518, 319 S.E.2d 177, 179 (1984).
7 E.g., United States v. Awkard, 597 ral 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979).
See infra notes 78-98 and accompanying text fin' cases dealing with the per se admissibility
approach.
" E.g., State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). See infra notes 97-101 and
accompanying text for cases dealing with the procedural sakguards approach.
" E.g., State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980). See infra notes 102-08 and accom-
panying text for cases dealing with the per se inadmissibility approach. See Sies Sc Weiner,
judicial Approaches to the Question of Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony: A History
and Analysis, 35 DE PAUL L. REV. 77, 78-79 (1985) (examination of all three approaches).
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cally refreshed testimony.° The procedural safeguards approach
allows the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony provided
that the hypnotist follows certain procedural guidelines both before
and during the hypnosis session." The per se inadmissibility stan-
dard excludes all hypnotically refreshed testimony. The standard
does allow previously hypnotized witnesses to take the stand, but
limits their testimony to events that the witnesses can prove they
recalled prior to hypnosis and to events that are unrelated to the
content of the hypnosis sessions. 12 Recently, as courts have con-
fronted scientific studies that detail the unreliable nature of hyp-
notically refreshed testimony, they have begun to move away from
the per se admissibility standard and have increasingly chosen the
procedural safeguards or the per se inadmissibility approach. 13 In
Rock v. Arkansas, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
question of the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony for
the first time, ruling on the question of whether Arkansas's per se
exclusionary rule prohibiting the admission of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony violated a criminal defendant's constitutional
right to testify on his or her own behalf.' 4
In Rock, the State of Arkansas charged Vicki Rock with man-
slaughter in the July 2, 1983 shooting death of her husband, Frank
Rock. On that night, a fight erupted between the couple when Mr.
Rock refused to let Ms. Rock eat some of his pizza and refused to
allow her to leave the apartment to get something to eat. When the
police arrived on the scene, they found Mr. Rock on the floor with
a bullet wound in his chest.th According to an investigating officer's
testimony, Ms. Rock stated that as she began to leave the room, her
husband grabbed her by the throat, choked her, and threw her
against the wall.'" Ms. Rock recounted that she then picked up a
gun; Mr. Rock hit her again, and then she shot him.' 7
 Ms. Rock was
unable, however, to recall the shooting's exact details.' 8
l'r See, e.g., Awkard, 597 F.2d at 669.
" See, e.g., Hurd, 86 N.J. at 535-37, 432 A.2d at 89-90; see also P. GIANNELLI & E.
listwINKELFtwo, supra note 3, at 360-61.
"See, e.g., Mack, 292 N.W,2d at 772.
' 5 See, e.g., Hurd, 86- NJ, at 535-37, 432 A.2d at 91; People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18,
36-37, 723 P.2d 1354, 1364; 181 Cal, Rptr. 243, 253-54 (1982); see also P. GIANNE1.1.1 & E.
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 3, at 359.
' Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2706 (1987).
'l Ed.
15 1d.
I? Id. Another officer stated that Ms. Rock said the "gun went off" rather than "she shot
him." Id. at 2706 n.l.
18 Id. at 2706.
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Following her lawyer's advice, Ms. Rock underwent hypnosis
to refresh her memory. Dr. Betty Back, a licensed neuropsycholo-
gist, hypnotized Ms. Rock twice.'" Prior to the first hypnosis session,
the doctor questioned Ms. Rock about the state of her present.
memory of the incident and recorded the interview via handwritten
notes. 2° Ms. Rock did not relate any new information during either
session. 21 After the hypnosis, however, she recalled that, at the time
of the shooting, her thumb was not on the trigger of the gun, but
rather, on its hammer. Ms. Rock also remembered that the gun
discharged when her husband grabbed her arm while they were
scuffling. Ms. Rock's lawyer then had the gun examined by an
experC, who discovered that the gun was defective and prone to fire
when simply hit or dropped. 22
Upon learning that Ms. Rock had undergone hypnosis, the
prosecutor filed a motion to exclude her testimony. The trial judge
issued an order limiting Ms. Rock's testimony to the information
contained in Dr. Back's notes taken prior to the first hypnosis ses-
sion. 23
 A jury subsequently convicted Ms. Rock of manslaughter,
and the trial judge sentenced her to ten years imprisonment and
fined her $10,000. 24
Ms. Rock appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Arkansas,
claiming that the limitation of her testimony violated her right to
present her defense. 25
 The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected Ms.
Rock's claim and decided to adopt the approach taken by the state
courts that have held witnesses' hypnotically refreshed testimony as
inadmissible per se. 2" Ms. Rock petitioned for a writ of certiorari,
which the United States Supreme Court granted.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court declared Arkansas's per
se rule unconstitutional. 27
 Writing for the majority, Justice Black-
mun stated that Arkansas's per se prohibition on hypnotically re-
freshed testimony infringed impermissibly on a criminal defen-
19 Id .
2" Id at 2706 & n.2.
2 ' Id. at 2707.
22
23
24 Id.
25 Id. See also Rock v. State, 708 S.W.2d 78 (Ark, 1986). The Arkansas Supreme Court
opinion dues not specify which constitutional rights Ms. Rock claimed were violated. See Ruck,
708 S.W.2d at 84-86.
2" Rock, 708 S.W.2d at 79.
V Ruck, 107 S. Ct. at 2714, 2715.
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(lanes constitutional right to testify on his or her own behalf. 28 The
Court held that, when the admission of a criminal defendant's
hypnotically refreshed testimony is at stake, the trial court must
employ a case-by-case balancing test. 2" The trial court may exclude
such testimony only if a state can prove that the testimony is so
unreliable in a particular case that the state's interest in avoiding
unreliable testimony outweighs the criminal defendant's constitu-
tional right to testify. 3° Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
dissent, argued that the Constitution does not dictate that the tes-
timony of criminal defendants is immune from state courts' rules
of evidence designed to ensure the reliability of testimony, and
concluded that the Arkansas rule passed constitutional muster."'
Before the Supreme Court addressed the question, state and
federal courts had developed three standards: per se admissibility,
per se inadmissibility, and a qualified admissibility based on an ad-
herence to procedural safeguards." 2
 In Rock, the Supreme Court
held that the standard that had been emerging as the most prevalent
of the three among state courts, per se inadmissibility, violates a
criminal defendant's constitutional right to testify on his or her own
behalf.'" Thus, state courts may no longer automatically limit a
criminal defendant's testimony to that which he or she can prove
was recalled prior to hypnosis." A state court may still exclude a
criminal defendant's post-hypnotic testimony, but may not do so in
a mechanistic fashion. State courts must utilize a case-by-case bal-
ancing test, weighing the unreliability of potential testimony against
a criminal defendant's constitutional right to testify. 35
Although the Court expressly stated that its holding applied
only to the hypnotically refreshed testimony of criminal defen-
dants,"6
 the Court's reasoning clearly opens the doors of admissi-
2' Id. The Court limited its holding only to the hypnotically refreshed testimony of
criminal defendants. Thus, the holding has no direct implications for defense witnesses other
than the defendant, and has no direct implications for the admissibility of hypnotically
refreshed testimony in civil proceedings. Id. at 2712 n.15.
29 Id, at 2714.
II Id. at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
32 See infra notes 78-108 and accompanying text.
" Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
" Id. Although no federal courts have presently excluded hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony on a per se basis, the holding in Rock effectively precludes them from adopting such a
standard in the future in regard to the hypnotically refreshed testimony of criminal defen-
dants.
35 Id.
36 hi. at 2712 n.15.
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bility to the hypnotically refreshed testimony of all criminal defense
witnesses. Furthermore, the Rock opinion, as a whole, does not rest
upon firm pragmatic and• legal ground. The Court ignored the
special dangers that hypnotically refreshed testimony poses to our
truth-seeking process. This refusal to recognize the unreliability of
hypnotically refreshed testimony allowed the Court to misapply
precedent, as it enabled the Court to rely upon decisions that clearly
are inapplicable to state rules that govern the admissibility of in-
herently untrustworthy testimony. •
Section one of this casenote reviews a • criminal defendant's
fourteenth and sixth amendment rights to present a defense," and
then explores the limitations that a state may place upon this right."
Section one ends with a 'review of the approaches that courts have
taken regarding the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony. 3" Section two of this casenote examines the majority opinion
of Rock,`'" and section three reviews the dissenting opinion of Rock.'"
Finally, section four of this casenote analyzes and criticizes the
Court's holding, concluding that the Supreme Court incorrectly
decided Rock, and, as a result, has posed a serious threat to the
integrity of our trial process. 42
1. BACKGROUND
A. A Criminal Defendant's Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment Rights to
Present a Defense
The fourteenth 43 and Sixth94 amendments of the United States
Constitution establish a criminal defendant's right to present a de-
" 7 See infra notes 43-55 and accompanying text,
See infra notes 56-77 and accompanying text.
"9 See infra notes 78-108 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 109-34 and accompanying text.
4i See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 140-65 and accompanying text,
" U.S. CoNsT, amend, XI V, § 1. - Section one states that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id,
" U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The sixth amendment states that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
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fense on his or her own behalf. In regard to a criminal defendant's
right to personally testify on his or her own behalf, the United
States Supreme Court, in Ferguson v. Georgia, outlined the history
of the transition from a rule of a criminal defendant's incompetency,
which prevented a criminal defendant from testifying on a per se
basis, to a rule of competency, which allowed a criminal defendant
to testify." The rule of competency, the Court asserted, rested on
the assumption that both the "detection of guilt" and "the protection
of innocence" are best achieved when criminal defendants are al-
lowed to testify." In addition, the Supreme Court has declared that
the rule of competency is mandated not only by logic, but also by
the fourteenth and sixth amendments. In In Re Oliver, a Michigan
circuit judge was conducting a one-man grand jury investigation
into alleged gambling and official corruption. 47 Petitioner William
Oliver, obeying a subpeona, appeared before the judge and gave
testimony. The judge told him that his story did not "jell," and
immediately sentenced him to sixty days in jail. The United States
Supreme Court held that, because Mr. Oliver did not have an
opportunity to present a defense, the State of Michigan had violated
his fourteenth amendment due process rights." Thus in Oliver, the
Supreme Court enunciated what it regarded as the most basic in-
gredients of due process of law: a criminal defendant possesses the
right to be heard in his or her defense, including as a minimum,
the right to examine opposing witnesses and the right to offer
testimony. 49
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defence.
Id.
45
 Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573-82 (1961).
"Id. at 581. The Court stated: "In sum, decades ago the considered consensus of the
English-speaking world came to be that there was no rational justification for prohibiting the
sworn testimony of the accused, who above all others may be in a position to meet the
prosecution's case." Id. at 582. In Ferguson the Court held that a Georgia statute that limited
a criminal defendant's presentation at trial to an unsworn statement violated the fourteenth
amendment in that the statute denied the defendant ''the right to have his counsel question
him to elicit his statement." Id. at 596. The Court did not address the question of whether a
defendant possesses a constitutional right to testify, because the case did not present a
challenge to the specific Georgia statute that rendered a criminal defendant incompetent to
testify. Id. at 572 n. 1. Two Justices, in concurrence, however, argued for the establishment
of such a right. Id. at 600-01, 602 (Clark, J., concurring).
" In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 258-59 (1948).
4B
49 Id. at 273. The Court in Oliver wrote:
A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge againsi him, and an oppor-
tunity to be heard in his defense — a right to his day in court — are basic in
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In addition to the fourteenth amendment's guarantees, the
sixth amendment assures the accused the right "to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,"" a right that is guar-
anteed by the fourteenth amendment to defendants in state criminal
courts.'' The Supreme Court in Washington v. Texas held that a
criminal defendant possesses a sixth amendment right to present a
defense, including the right to offer the testimony of his or her
own witnesses. 52 In Faretta.v. California" the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the sixth amendment does not merely mandate that a
defense be made for the accused, but rather, that the accused "per-
sonally" has the right to present his or her own defense. 54 The
Court stated that the defendant, and not the defendant's counsel,
possesses the sixth amendment right to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his or her favor." In sum, the fourteenth
and sixth amendments combine to assure criminal defendants the
general right to present a defense. This general right includes the
rights to examine Opposing witnesses, offer testimony, and present
favorable witnesses.
B. Limits That State Courts and Legislatures Have Attempted to Place
Upon a Criminal Defendant's Right to Present a Defense
Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the fourteenth
and sixth amendments to guarantee a criminal defendant the right
to present a defense, states" have attempted to limit this right. 57
Specifically, states have established rules that dictate when a criminal
defendant could not present witnesses. The Supreme Court, how-
our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right
to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented
by counsel.
Id. (footnote omitted).
59 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
51 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967).
52 Id. at 19.
53 Fareua v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). The Court held that a criminal defendant
possesses a constitutional right'to proceed without counsel when he or she voluntarily elects
to do so. Id. at 836:
34 Id. at 819.
53 Id.
5H "States" refers both to rules created by slate courts as well as those promulgated by
state legislatures, For example, in Chambers v, Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973), a state
court's hearsay rule was in question. See infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text. In Wash-
ington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 15 (1967), a state statute was in question, See infra notes 58-67
and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284 (1973).
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ever, has consistently held that such rules, as applied, violate a
criminal defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. Spe-
cifically, the Supreme Court has held that the sixth and fourteenth
amendments prevent states from attempting to bar the unreliable
testimony of criminal defense witnesses from their courtrooms by
the use of absolute, mechanical, or arbitrary rules of disqualification
and exclusion.
In Washington v. Texas, the Supreme Court reviewed such an
attempt by a state. The defendant in Washington, Jackie Washington,
was charged with murder.58 At trial, Mr. Washington attempted to
offer proof that another man, Charles Fuller, had committed the
murder by himself. 59 Mr. Fuller, however, had already been con-
victed of the murder, and a Texas statute,"° prohibiting persons
charged as accomplices in the same crime from testifying for one
another, barred him from testifying on Mr. Washington's behalf."'
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren concluded that
Texas violated Mr. Washington's sixth amendment compulsory pro-
cess right because the state prevented an entire class of defense
witnesses from testifying simply by asserting that such witnesses
belong to "a priori categories" that presume that such witnesses'
testimony is untrustworthy.62 The Court stated that Texas may not
achieve the goal of preventing perjury through the categorical ex-
clusion of defense witnesses." Citing Rosen v. United States," the
w 388 U.S. 14, 14-15 (1967).
'" Id. at 16. The opinion states, "it is undisputed that Fuller's testimony would have been
relevant and material, and that it was vital to the defense" after noting that "[t]he record
indicates that Fuller would have testified that petitioner [Washington .] pulled at him and tried
to persuade him to leave, and that petitioner ran before Fuller fired the fatal shot." Id.
"u TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 82 (repealed 1967) (Vernon 1974).
Washington, 388 U.S. at 16 n.4.
12 Id. at 22-23.
"' Id. at 22; see also Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. Riw. 115 (1974)
(preeminent article on the history and present day applications of the compulsory process
clause). The Texas statute apparently assumed that accomplices would be prone to perjure
themselves in order to extricate one another. Washington, 388 U.S. at 21.
l" Washington, 388 U.S. at 22 (quoting Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918)).
The Washington Court stated that:
IT]he conviction of our time [is] that the truth is more Likely to be arrived at
by hearing the testimony of all persons of competent understanding who may
seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and
weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury or by the court ... .
Id. In Rosen, the Supreme Court expressly overruled United States v. Reid, 12 U.S. (I Flow.)
361 (1852). 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918). Reid held that criminal co-defendants could not testify
for one another. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1852). Although Rosen rested on statutory grounds,
the Washington Court stated that the sixth amendment required the reasoning in Rosen.
Washington, 388 U.S. at 22.
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Washington Court stressed that Texas could have achieved its goal
of preventing perjury without excluding accomplices' testimony,
simply by leaving the weight and credibility of such testimony to
the jury."' The Court reiterated its support for a rule of general
competency of witnesses, explaining that a state should allow all
persons of "competent understanding" to testify, rather than ex-
clude witnesses' testimony in a wholesale fashion.° The Court ruled
that a jury was capable of making individual determinations of
credibility and trustworthiness.67
In addition to reviewing the limits a state may place upon a
criminal defendant's right to present witnesses, the Supreme Court
addressed in Chambers v. Mississippi whether a state may limit a
criminal defendant's witness's testimony once that person has taken
the stand."8 In Chambers, the defendant, Leon Chambers, was on
trial for the murder of a police officer.° Prior to Mr. Chambers's
trial, another man, Gable McDonald, confessed in writing to the
same murder and also admitted to three different friends on three
different occasions that he had killed the police officer." Mr. Cham-
bers called Mr. McDonald to the stand, whereupon Mr. McDonald
repudiated his written confession." Mr. Chambers then found him-
self unable to cross-examine Mr. McDonald about the repudiation
of his confession because of Mississippi's common law voucher rule
that prohibited a party from impeaching his or her own witness:72
Furthermore, Mississippi's hearsay rule prevented Mr. Chambers
from introducing Mr. McDonald's oral admissions."
The United States Supreme Court held that the exclusion of
the hearsay evidence coupled with the state court's prohibition on
65 Washington, 388 U.S. at 21-22 (quoting Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471
(1918)); see also Westen, supra note 63, at 115-16.
"6 Washington, 388 U.S. at 22 (quoting Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918)).
417 Id. at 22 (quoting Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918)). Professor Westen
wrote in regard to the Washington opinion:
That the ,jury is deemed an adequate measurer of credibility bears directly on
the standard for determining the competence of defense witnesses. It means
that the defendant has a right to present any witness whose credibility is gen.
uinely at issue, and that witnesses cannot be barred from testifying on his behalf
unless they are so untrustworthy as to provide no basis short of pure speculation
for evaluating their testimony.
Westen, supra note 63, at 136.
"" Chambers y. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
"9 Id. at 285.
7" Id. at 287, 289.
71 Id. at 288.
72 1d. at. 295.
" Id. at 292.
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cross-examination of Mr. McDonald denied Mr. Chambers "a trial
in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due pro-
cess."74 The Court noted that, although the exclusion of hearsay
testimony is widely accepted throughout the country, when a crim-
inal defendant's right to present a defense is at issue, a hearsay rule
may not be applied "mechanistically" to exclude hearsay evidence
that bears "persuasive assurances of trustworthiness," 75 and in Cham-
bers the Court concluded that the excluded hearsay was extremely
trustworthy:76
 In short, the Court held that a state rule of evidence
may not be used absolutely to exclude evidence that bears indicia
of reliability when such evidence is critical to a criminal defendant's
defense."
In sum, Washington and Chambers establish that state courts and
legislatures may not attempt to prevent the introduction of unreli-
able testimony by defense witnesses in their criminal courts by the
use of absolute, mechanical, or arbitrary rules of disqualification
and exclusion. Instead, when a criminal defendant's right to put on
a defense is at stake, a state court or legislature may only attempt
to ensure the reliability of defense witnesses' testimony by leaving
74 Id. at 302. Although the Court spoke of the defendant's right to present a defense in
"due process" terms, it appears that the Court actually used a sixth amendment compulsory
process clause analysis, as the Court cited Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), as a
source of the defendant's right to present a defense. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. Possible
explanations for this include the fact that the author of the Chambers opinion, Justice Powell,
opposes the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment and the fact
that the defendant did not raise the issue of his sixth amendment compulsory process clause
rights in the lower court. Westen, supra, note 63, at 151 n.384; see also Comment, Polygraph
Admission Through Compulsory Process, 16 AKRON L. REV. 761, 773 n.76 (1983). Further evidence
of the assertion that Chambers is in fact a compulsory process clause case is seen in the dissent
of the Rock opinion where Chambers is clearly cited as being a compulsory process clause case.
Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2716 (1987) (Rehnquist, CT, dissenting).
"Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
76 Id. at 300-01. The Chambers Court noted:
The hearsay statements involved in this case were originally made and subse-
quently offered at trial under circumstances that provided considerable assur-
ance of their reliability. First, each of McDonald's confessions was made spon-
taneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder had occurred. Second,
each one was corroborated by some other evidence in the case — McDonald's
sworn confession, the testimony of an eyewitness to the shooting, the testimony
that McDonald was seen with agun immediately after the shooting, and proof
of his prior ownership of a .22-caliber revolver and subsequent purchase of a
new weapon. The sheer number of independent confessions provided addi-
tional corroboration for each. Third, whatever may be the parameters of the
penal-interest rationale, each confession here was in a very real sense self-
incriminatory and unquestionably against interest.
Id. (citation omitted).
74 Id. at 302.
March 1989]	 HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY	 583
the weight and credibility of such testimony to the jury:A court
may only disqualify witnesses and exclude evidence if, in the par-
ticular case at hand, the potential witness or' testimony is so unre-
liable that it would be impossible for a jury to weigh its credibility.
C. Approaches Courts Have Taken Regarding the Admissibility of
Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony
Only relatively recently have courts begun to address the ques-
tion of hypnotically refreshed testimony. During this period of time,
however, courts have developed three distinct approaches to the
problem. Initially, courts admitted hypnotically refreshed testimony
on a per se basis. Then,.as scientific studies detailing the unreliable
nature of hypnotically refreshed testimony became available, courts
began to move away from the per se admissibility approach and
began either to hold hypnotically refreshed testimony inadmissible
per se, or to admit hypnotically refreshed testimony only if the
hypnotist adhered to certain procedural safeguards both during
and before the hypnosis session. In 1968 the Maryland Special
Court of Appeals was the first court to rule in a'reported opinion
on the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony: 78 In Hard-
ing v. State the court held hypnotically refreshed testimony admis-
sible per se, leaving to the trier of fact to determine the weight of
such evidence:79 Today, a number of state and federal courts still
hold that hypnotically refreshed testimony is admissible per se."°
State courts, however, have increasingly rejected the rationale
underlying Harding and its progeny, thus placing the validity of
these cases in serious question." The major criticism of the Harding
See Harding v State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert, denied, 395 U.S. 949
(1969).
79 Id. at '236, 246 A.2d at 306.
se For federal courts taking the per se admissibility approach, see: Beck v. Norris, 801
F.2d '242 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Awkard, 597 1 7.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 885 (1979); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 103 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006
(1978); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller
Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974). For state examples, see: People v. Smrekar, 68 III. App.
3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756 (La. 1983); State v. Brown,
337 N.W.2d 138 (N.1). 1983); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971); State
v. Glcbock, 616 S,W.2d 897 (Fenn. Crim, App. 1981); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280
(Wyo. 1982).
"I See, e.g., State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983), overruling Harding v.
State, 5 Md. App. '230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969); State v. Mack,
292 N.W,2d 764 (Minn. 1980); State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984),
overriding State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); see also P. GIANNELI.I & E.
IMWINKELRILtD, supra note 3, at 359; Hypnotically Induced Testimony, supra note 6, at 172, 201.
584	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:573
approach is its failure to take into account recognized scientific
opinion regarding the nature and dangers of hypnotically refreshed
testirnony. 82 The scientific community agrees that hypnosis is not,
by nature, a retriever of actual memories, and thus is not a source
of accurate, reliable testimony. 83 Rather, scientists agree that when
hypnosis is used to enhance a witness's memory, a series of phe-
nomena is unleashed which seriously calls into question the reli-
ability of the witness's resultant recollections."
First, hypnosis by its very nature is a process of suggestion that
renders its subject extremely receptive to suggestions that the sub-
ject perceives as emanating from the hypnotist. 83 The hypnotist can
transmit suggestions to the subject even when the hypnotist does
not intend to do so and even when the hypnotist cannot perceive
any transference of suggestions.86 The suggestive cues need not be
verbal. Such factors as the hypnotist's attitude, demeanor, expec-
tations, tone of voice, and body language all may communicate
suggestive messages to the subject. 87
Second, a person under hypnosis experiences a compelling
desire to comply with the hypnotist, and thus produce the response
that he or she believes the hypnotist wants to hear.88 As a result,
rather than admit that he or she is unable to recall certain facts, a
subject will often create a memory comprised of relevant actual
facts, irrelevant actual facts from past unrelated experiences, fan-
tasized gap-fillers or confabulations, and conscious lies. 89 Further-
more, hypnosis impairs a subject's critical judgment capabilities.
Thus, a person under hypnosis is likely to give significant credence
" Hypnotically Induced Testimony, supra note 6, at 201; see Recent Development, Growing
Disenchantment with Hypnotic Means of Refreshing Witness Recall, 41 VAND. L. REV. 379, 392-
407 (1988).
" Use and Misuse, supra note 2, at 76.
" See generally Use and Misuse, supra note 2, at 68-84; Hypnotically Induced Testimony, supra
note (1, at 171-204; Diamond, supra note 4 at 313-15, 332-42.
" See People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 63, 723 P.2d 1354, 1382, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 270-
71 (1982); Diamond, supra note 4, at 333. The California Supreme Court produced a
summary of the professional literature on hypnotically refreshed testimony relying primarily
on the 'works of two of the field's most preeminent scholars, Dr. Martin T. Orne and Dr.
Bernard L. Diamond. See Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 63 n.45, 723 P.2d at 1381 n.45, 181 Cal. Rptr.
at 270-71 n.45.
"6 Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 64, 723 P.2d at 1382, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271; see also Diamond,
supra note 4, at 333.
87 Diamond, supra note 4, at 333.
8" Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 64, 723 P.2d at 1382, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
" Shirley, 31 Cal, 3d at 64, 723 1'.2d at 1382, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271; see aLso Diamond,
supra note 4, at 335.
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to vague and sketchy recollections that he or she would not have
relied upon prior to undergoing hypnosis."'"
Absent a means for independent corroboration, no one can
discern whether hypnotically refreshed memories are fact or fic-
tion."' During hypnosis neither the subject nor the hypnotist is able
to differentiate between actual and fabricated memories. Moreover,
afterwards, when the subject repeats such recollections at trial, no
one, neither hypnosis expert nor trier of fact, will be able to distin-
guish between true and false recollections."' The detail and plausi-
bility of the subject's recollections are not at all probative of truth-
fulness, as the subject may confabulate while under hypnosis in an
effort to present a lucid, logical recollection of events in order to
please the hypnotist."
Finally, a witness who is unsure of his or her recollections prior
to hypnosis will likely become convinced that his or her post-hyp-
notic recollections are assuredly correct."' Each time the subject is
asked to repeat his or her hypnotically refreshed recollections, the
subject's belief' that the recollections are true and accurate grows
stronger."5 This potentially renders cross-examination incapable of
detecting unreliable testimony because the subject's convictions re-
garding the truth of his or her hypnotically refreshed recollections
are so strong and persuasive.""
Confronted with professional literature and testimony that de-
tailed the unreliable nature of hypnotically refreshed testimony and
the impossibility, even through cross-examination, of distinguishing
between reliable and unreliable recollections, state and federal
courts began to move away from the Harding approach of admitting
hypnotically refreshed testimony on a per se basis."' In fact, the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals overruled Harding in Collins v.
"" Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 64, 723 P.2d at 1382, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271; see also Diamond,
supra note 4, at 340.
"' Shirley, 31 Cal, 3d at 135, 723 I',2d at 1382, 181 Cal, Rptr. at 271-72.
92 Id. See also Diamond, supra note 4, at 333-34, 337, 340-41.
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 64-65, 723 P.2d at 1382-83, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271-72; see also
Diamond, supra note 4, at 337-40.
94 Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 65, 723 P.2c1 at 1383, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271-72; see also Diamond,
supra note 4, at 339-40.
"Shirley, 31 Cal, 3d at 65-60, 723 1).2d at 1383, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271-73.
" Id. See also Dianunni, supra note 4, at. 339-40; Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 138-
39 (Alaska 1980) (holding that criminal defendants were deprived of confrontational rights
when cross-examining a hostile, hypnotically refreshed witness because of the danger that
the witness's demeanor and confidence could he altered by the hypnosis).
"7 See supra note 81 and accompanying text; see also Sies	 Wester, supra note 9, at 93;
Hypnotically Induced Testimony, supra note 6, at 172, 201-03.
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State." In response to the scientific community's findings, some state
and federal courts have adopted a procedural safeguards approach,
which permits hypnotically refreshed testimony's admission if the
proponent of the hypnotically refreshed testimony follows certain
procedural safeguards regarding the hypnosis session." In State v.
Hurd, the leading procedural safeguards case, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court promulgated procedural guidelines that the propo-
nent of hypnotically refreshed testimony must follow in order for
such testimony to gain admission at trial.m The Hurd court's guide-
lines include the requirements that an independent, licensed psy-
chiatrist or psychologist should conduct the hypnosis session, that
the hypnotist should make a record of the subject's pre-hypnosis
memory, and that the hypnosis session should be recorded, prefer-
ably on videotape."'"
A growing number of state courts, 10" however, have opted to
go beyond the procedural safeguards approach and have chosen to
98
 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983) (adopting per se inadmissibility standard).
99
 For cases that admit hypnotically refreshed testimony in accordance with procedural
safeguards, see Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986); United States v. Harrington, 18 M.J. 797 (A.C.M.R. 1984);
People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1987); State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 682 P.2d
571 (1984); House v. State, 445 So. 2t1 815 (Miss. 1984); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432
A.2d 86 (1981); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (N.M. App. 1981), writ quashed,
98 N.M. 51, 644 P.2d 1040 (1982); State v. Weston, 16 Ohio App. 3d 279, 475 N.E.2d 805
(1984); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946
(1983).
100
 The six procedural safeguards the New Jersey Supreme Court promulgated in State
v, Hurd are as follows;
(1) The hypnotic session should be conducted by a licensed psychiatrist or
psychologist trained in the use of hypnosis. (2) The qualified professional con-
ducting the hypnotic session should be independent of and not responsible to
the prosecutor, investigator or the defense. (3) Any information given to the
hypnotist by law enforcement personnel prior to the hypnotic session must be
in written form so that subsequently the extent of the information the subject
received from the hypnotist may be determined. (4) Before induction of hyp-
noiis, the hypnotist should obtain from the subject a detailed description of the
facts as the subject remembers them, carefully avoiding adding any new ele-
ments to the witness' description of the events. (5) All contacts between the
hypnotist and the subject should be recorded so that a permanent record is
available for comparison and study to establish that the witness has not received
information or suggestion which might later be reported as having been first
described by the subject during hypnosis. Videotape should be employed if
possible, but should not be mandatory. (6) Only the hypnotist and the subject
should be present during any phase of the hypnotic session, including the pre-
hypnotic testing and post-hypnotic interview.
86 N.J. 525, 533, 432 A.2d 86, 89-90 (1981).
Ioi Id.
102 No Federal courts have adopted a per se exclusion rule. See P. GIANNELL1 & E. IstwiN-
KELMED, supra note 3, at 353 n.38.
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exclude hypnotically refreshed testimony on a per se basis." These
state courts simply view hypnotically refreshed testimony as so un-
reliable,'" and thus so dangerous," that its complete exclusion
outweighs any potential loss of accurate inFormation. 106 When the
California Supreme Court adopted a per se exclusion standard in
People v. Shirley, the court also Forcefully rejected the Hurd proce-
dural safeguards approach. 1 °7 The California Supreme Court ar-
'"' For cases adopting a per se inadmissibility standard, see Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d
129 (Alaska 1986); State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2c1 1266
(1982); People v. Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d 385, 090 P.2d 635, 208 Cal. Rptr, 162 (1985); People v.
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 723 1'.2d 1354, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982); State v. Davis, 490 A.2d
601 (Del. Super. 1985); Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 295
(1986); Walraven v. State, 255 Ga. 276, 336 S.E,2d 798 (1985); State v. Moreno, 709 P.2d
103 (Haw. 1985); State v. Haislip, 237 Kan. 401, 701 P.2d 909, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022
(1985); State v. Collins, 290 Md. 670, 404 A.2d 1028 (1983); People v. Gonzalez, 415 Mich,
615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982), modified, 417 Mich. 968, 336 N.W.2d 751 (1983) (court modified
its earlier opinion by stating that the opinion did not exclude a witness's pre-hypnotic
recollections); State v, Koehler, 312 N.W.2cl 108 (Minn. 1981); State v, Mack, 292 N.W.2d
764 (Minn. 1980); Alsbach v. Badar, 700 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1985); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb.
206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 206 (1987); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d
523, 453 N.E.2d 484 (1983); State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984); Harmon
v, State, 700 P.2d 212 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); Robison v. State, (177 P.2d 1080 (Okla, Crim.
App.), cell. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436
A.2d 170 (1981); State v. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 684 l',2d 651 (1984). These states, with
the exception of California, do not hold that a previously hypnotized witness is fully incom-
petent to testify, but limit his or her testimony to that which the witness can prove to have
been recalled prior to hypnosis. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. In People v. Shirley
the California Supreme Court opted for a harsher rule, holding that a previously hypnotized
witness is incompetent to testify as to any events that were the subject of a hypnosis session,
including pre-hyphotic recollections. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 66-67, 723 P.2d 1354, 1384. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court did, however, carve out an exception for criminal defendants, allowing
them to testify even if they had been previously hypnotized. Id. at 67, 723 P.2d at 1384.
"" See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
'" 5 Dr. Bernard 1.. Diamond writes:
1 believe that once a potential witness has been hypnotized for the purpose of
enhancing memory his recollections have been so contaminated that he is ren.
tiered effectively incompetent to testify. Hypnotized persons, being extremely
suggestible, graft onto their memories fantasies or suggestions deliberately or
unwittingly communicated by the hypnotist. After hypnosis the subject cannot
differentiate between a (rue recollection and a fantasy or a suggested detail.
Neither can any expert or the trier of fact. This risk is so great, in my view,
that the use of hypnosis by police on a potential winless is tantamount to the
•	 destruction or fabrication of evidence.'
Diamond, supra note 4, at 314.
l "6 See, e.g., State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 531, 319 S.E.2d 177, 186 (1984); People v.
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 39, 723 P.2d 1354, 1365-66; see also P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 3, at 353. Many of the courts that have excluded hypnotically refreshed testimony
on a per se basis have used a Frye rationale, holding that hypnotically refreshed testimony
was simply not accepted by the scientific conanunity. Hypnotically Induced Testimony, .supra note
6, at 202 (discussing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
'° 31 Cal. 3d 18, 39, 723 P.2d 1354, 1305-66.
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gued that the Hurd rules are only designed to prevent the hypnotist
from exploiting the suggestibility of the subject, and that no safe-
guards exist that a court can employ to detect when the subject has
lost his or her critical judgment or when the subject is confabulating.
Furthermore, the Shirley court contended that procedural safe-
guards cannot determine whether a witness is relating accurate or
false recollections, nor can any set of safeguards detect when a
witness is exuding a false sense of confidence in his or her testi-
mony.'"
In summary, the fourteenth and sixth amendments guarantee
to a criminal defendant the right to present a defense, which in-
cludes the rights to examine opposing witnesses, offer testimony,
and present favorable witnesses. As a result, states may not attempt
to bar the unreliable testimony of defense witnesses from their
criminal courtrooms by the use of absolute, mechanical, or arbitrary
rules of disqualification and exclusion. The question then arises as
to whether a state's efforts to keep what it perceives as inherently
unreliable hypnotically refreshed testimony from its courtrooms
infringes upon a criminal defendant's constitutional right to present
a defense. The United States Supreme Court addressed this ques-
tion in Rock v. Arkansas.
II. THE ROCK MAJORITY OPINION
The Supreme Court, in Rock v. Arkansas, held that Arkansas's
per se rule excluding hypnotically refreshed testimony impermissibly
infringes upon a criminal defendant's constitutional right to testify
on his or her own behalf at trial.'" The majority recognized that
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, the sixth amend-
ment's compulsory process clause, and the fifth amendment's pro-
hibition of compelled testimony combined to produce the right to
testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial."° The Court then
relied upon Washington v. Texas and Chambers v. Mississippi to deter-
mine whether Arkansas's per se exclusionary rule violated a criminal
defendant's constitutional right to testify."' The Court concluded
that, when a criminal defendant's constitutional right to testify is at
stake, a state may not use per se exclusionary rules unless the state
1 °8 /d.
"1° Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2709 (1987).
Ha Id. at 2709-10.
'" Id. at 2710-11, 2715.
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can prove that all of the evidence in question is unreliable. 112 Ap-
plying this standard to the facts of Rock, the Court held that Ar-
kansas had not proven that hypnotically refreshed testimony is
always so untrustworthy to warrant its exclusion on a per se basis,
and thus determined that Arkansas's per se exclusionary rule im-
permissibly infringed upon a criminal defendant's constitutional
right to testify." 3
 The Court thereby limited its holding to the
hypnotically refreshed testimony of criminal defendants only." 4
The majority emphasized the law's movement from a general ...
rule of criminal defendants' incompetency to testify to a rule of
competency, which permits criminal defendants to testify.'" The
Court interpreted the fourteenth amendment's due process clause
as containing this rule, citing In re Oliver for the proposition that
every criminal defendant has a right to "an opportunity to be heard in
his defense."" 6 The Court also noted that the sixth amendment's
compulsory process clause, which grants a criminal defendant the
right to call "witnesses in his favor," contains this right to testify on
one's own behalf."' The Court reasoned that, because the compul-
sory process clause grants to criminal defendants the right to call
favorable witnesses, it must also logically include the criminal de-
fendant's right to call himself or herself to the stand and to testify. 118
Relying upon Faretta v. California, which held that the sixth amend-
ment grants to the accused the right to "personally" present his or
her own defense, the Court concluded that a defendant's right to
112 Id. at 2714.
115 /d.
1 " Id. at 2712 n.15.
' 15 Id. at 2708.
"" Id. at 2709 (citing In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)). The Court also cited a
footnote in Farelta v. California. Id. at 2709 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819
0.15 (1975)). In Faretta the Court held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right
to represent him or herself. 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975). The text or the opinion accompanying
footnote 15 states that the sixth amendment grants to a criminal defendant the right to
personally present his or her own defense. Id. at 819 n.15. In Rock the Court interpreted
footnote 15, which states in pertinent part, "[t]his Court has often recognized the constitu-
tional status of rights that, though not literally expressed in the document, are essential to
due process of law in a fair adversary process," as promulgating that a criminal defendant's
right to testify is one of those rights that are "essential to due process of' law in a fair adversary
process." Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2700. The Rock Court also cited Justice Clark's concurring
opinion in Ferguson v. Georgia, in which justice Clark urged that the Court interpret the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause as securing to the criminal defendant the right
"to choose between silence and testifying in his own behalf." Id. at 2709 (quoting Ferguson
v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 602 (1961) (Clark, J., concurring)).
" 7 Rock, 107 S. Ct. al 2709.
"81d,
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call witnesses and thereby present his or her defense is not complete
unless the defendant is allowed to take the stand and testify." 9 The
Court thus extended the scope of the compulsory process clause to
include the right of a criminal defendant to testify on his or her
own behalf.' 2° Additionally, the Court held that the opportunity to
testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial is a required corollary
to the fifth amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony. 12 '
Citing Harris v. New York,' 22
 the Court reasoned that, if the fifth
amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right not to testify,
the fifth amendment must also guarantee him or her the right to
testify if he or she desires.' 23
Having established a criminal defendant's right to testify on his
or her own behalf, the Court turned to the question of whether a
state court's rule of evidence that excludes hypnotically refreshed
testimony may restrict this right. The Court examined two cases in
which it previously dealt with constitutional challenges to state rules
designed to ensure trustworthy testimony, but which interfered with
the ability of a criminal defendant to offer evidence.' 24 The cases
were Washington v. Texas, in which the Court invalidated Texas's
accomplice statute that prevented persons charged as accomplices
in the same crime from testifying for one another, 125 and Chambers
v. Mississippi, in which the Court held that Mississippi may not use
its hearsay rule in an absolute, arbitrary fashion to exclude appar-
ently trustworthy evidence that is critical to a criminal defendant's
defense. 126
The Court cited Washington to establish that a state may not
arbitrarily deny a criminal defendant the right to present witnesses
19 /d. at 2709-10 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,819 (1975)).
12" Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2709-10.
121 1d. at 2710.
122 Id. (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,225,230 (1971)). In Harris, the Supreme
Court held that a statement elicited from a criminal defendant by police in violation of
Miranda v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 436 (1966), may be used for impeachment purposes. 401 U.S.
222,223-26 (1971).
123 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2710. In Harris, the Court stated: "Every criminal defendant is
privileged to testify in his own defense, or refuse to do so." 401 U.S. at 225. In addition,
three dissenting justices argued that the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination
guarantees the accused the right, "to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfet-
tered exercise of his own will." Harris, 401 U.S. at 230 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Malloy v.Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,8 (1964)).
124 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2710-11.
123 See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
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in his or her favor.'" In short, the Court used Washington to un-
derscore our country's general rule of competency of witnesses,
which rests on the rationale that the truth is more likely to be arrived
at when all persons with material knowledge of a case are allowed
to take the stand, and not through the disqualification of witnesses.
The Court relied upon Chambers to establish that a state rule of
evidence may not be applied in an absolute fashion to exclude
apparently trustworthy evidence that is critical to a criminal defen-
dant's defense. 128 Rather, the Court continued, a state may only
exclude such evidence if it can prove that its interests outweigh a
criminal defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. In
sum, the Court concluded that a state may only exclude such evi-
dence if it can prove that in a particular case the evidence is so
unreliable as to outweigh a criminal defendant's right to present
favorable evidence. 129
The Court applied these two principles to Arkansas's per se
prohibition on hypnotically refreshed testimony. 13" When a criminal
defendant's right to present a defense is at Stake, the Court con-
cluded, a state may only utilize per se exclusionary rules if, it can
prove by clear evidence that all of the evidence in question is un-
trustworthy. The Court held that Arkansas had not proven that
hypnotically refreshed testimony' is always so untrustworthy and so
immune to the traditional means of evaluating credibility — means
such as the prosecution's use of cross-examination and the judge's
issuance of cautionary instructions — to warrant its exclusion on a
per se basis."' Thus, the Court held that Arkansas's per se exclusion-
ary rule constituted an arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional
restraint upon a criminal defendant's right to testify.
The Court expressly limited its holding to the hypnotically
refreshed recollections of the criminal defendant only. 132 Further-
more, the Court did not unequivocally endorse the use of hypnosis
as an investigative tool.m Rather, the Court simply concluded that
Arkansas had not justified the exclusion of all a criminal defendant's
hypnotically refreshed recollections in light of a criminal defen-
dant's right to testify. The Court did, however, endorse the use of
127 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2710-11.
12 " Id. at 2711.
'" Id. at 2714 2714.
'" Id. at 2714.
"I Id.
192 Id. at 2712 n.15.
1 " Id. at 2714.
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procedural safeguards that assure that the hypnotist is an indepen-
dent psychiatrist or psychologist with special training in hypnosis,
and that the hypnosis is conducted in a neutral setting with only
the hypnotist and the subject present, and that the hypnosis session
is recorded on tape or videotape.'"
III. THE ROCK DISSENTING OPINION
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that the majori-
ty's interpretation of a criminal defendant's constitutional right to
testify was faulty, stating that both the due process and the com-
pulsory process clause decisions upon which the majority relied to
establish a criminal defendant's right to testify did not create an
absolute right to present evidence." 5
 The dissent argued that the
Constitution simply does not dictate that state courts' rules of evi-
dence designed to ensure the reliability of testimony are inapplic-
able to the testimony of criminal defendants. 136 Contending that
hypnotically refreshed testimony is inherently untrustworthy and
therefore dangerous to the truth-seeking process, the dissent also
asserted that a criminal defendant possesses no absolute right to
override state rules of evidence designed to ensure trustworthy
testimony.'" Thus, the dissent concluded that a state court's rule
that bars hypnotically refreshed testimony is constitutionally per-
missible, as a state court has the right to exclude untrustworthy
evidence and a criminal defendant does not possess an absolute
right to override such state courts' rules of evidence.
The dissent argued further that considerations of federalism
dictated that Arkansas's per se rule should be allowed to stand. 138
The Supreme Court, the dissent contended, has traditionally de-
ferred to the states in matters regarding criminal trial rules and
procedures, and should do so in regard to Arkansas's per se exclu-
sionary rule, especially because the rule in question involved an
unsettled area of science.'" In sum, the dissent concluded that the
Constitution simply does not warrant Supreme Court intervention,
' 34 Id.
135 /d. at 2715-16 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
' 36 1d. at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
13r
	 at 2715-16 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
139
	 The dissent stated: "'[W]e should not lightly construe the Constitution so as to
intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual states.'" Id. (quoting Patterson
v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,201 (1977)).
March 1989]	 HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY	 593
given the present. state of understanding regarding the nature of
hypnotically refreshed testimony.
I V. ROCK: ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
A. The Scope of Rock
The United. States Supreme Court held in Rock v. Arkansas that
states may not exclude the hypnotically refreshed testimony of crim-
inal defendants on a per se basis. 14" Instead, states must use a case-
by-case balancing test, weighing the unreliability of the potential
testimony against a criminal defendant's constitutional right to tes-
tify. This section examines the extent to which the Rock opinion
contains implications for all hypnotically refreshed defense wit-
nesses: 41 as well as criticizes the Court's reasoning and result: 42
Although the Rock Court expressly limited its holding to the
hypnotically refreshed testimony of criminal defendants, the deci-
sion's logic clearly opens the doors of admissibility to the hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony of criminal defense witnesses. The Court
located a criminal defendant's right to testify on his or her own
behalf in several provisions of the Constitution. The sixth amend-
ment's compulsory process clause guarantees a criminal defendant
the right to call material "witnesses in his favor." In Rock, the Su-
preme Court, for the first time, extended this phrase to include a
criminal defendant's right to testify on his or her own behalf. 143
Thus, the logic of the Court's reasoning mandates that a hypnoti-
cally refreshed defense witness whose potential testimony is material
to the defendant's case cannot be kept from testifying on a per se
basis. The Court cannot logically apply its holding to the right it
has just created — a criminal defendant's right to testify — and not
also apply its holding to the right that spawned the newly created
right — a criminal defendant's right to present favorable witnesses.
The Court also derived a criminal defendant's right to testify
from the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, reiterating
that a criminal defendant possesses a due process right to present
a defense: 44
 The Court did not rule that the due process clause
"" Id. at 2714.
"'See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
I" See infra notes 148-65 and accompanying text.
'" Rock, 107 S. et. at 2708-10.
144 Id. at 2709.
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grants greater protection to a criminal defendant's right to testify
than it does to a criminal defendant's right to present a defense in
general." 5
 It logically follows that this right would not only apply
to the defendant's testimony, but would also include all witnesses
who would be material to the defendant in presenting his or her
defense. In sum, there is no constitutional difference between the
importance of the material testimony of a hypnotically refreshed
defendant and that of a hypnotically refreshed defense witness. "°
Therefore, because the Court held that the per se exclusion of the
hypnotically refreshed testimony of criminal defendants violated
their constitutional right to present a defense, it seems virtually
inescapable that, in a future case, when the Court confronts the
issue of the admissibility of the hypnotically refreshed testimony of
a material criminal defense witness, that the Court must extend its
holding in Rock, and hold that the hypnotically refreshed testimony
of material defense witnesses cannot be excluded by courts on a per
se basis. 147
B. The Faulty Nature of the Majority Opinion
The Court in Rock v. Arkansas held that the hypnotically re-
freshed testimony standard that had emerged as a majority view
among state courts, per se inadmissibility, is unconstitutional when
applied to criminal defendants.' 48 Thus, state courts may no longer
automatically exclude all the hypnotically refreshed testimony of
criminal defendants. Instead, state courts must submit each case
involving the hypnotically refreshed testimony of a criminal defen-
dant to a balancing test, weighing the unreliability of the potential
testimony against the defendant's constitutional right to testify:49 A
court may exclude the hypnotically refreshed testimony of a crim-
inal defendant only if a state can prove that the particular testimony
"5 Id. See supra notes 48-49,131-32 and accompanying text.
145 See Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2709.
L47 Conceivably, not allowing a criminal defendant to present a material witness's hyp-
notically refreshed testimony might constitute a violation of the criminal defendant'S fifth
amendment privilege against compelled testimony, for if a material defense witness is not
allowed to testify, then the defendant, who may not want to take the stand, might be forced
to testify in order to offer particular testimony that the defense witness otherwise would have
offered.
148 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
149 Id.
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in question is so unreliable as to render a jury incapable of weighing
its credibility.'"
Both the legal reasoning and the result of this decision are
faulty. The Court relied upon Washington v. Texas and Chambers v.
Mississippi to establish a criminal defendant's right to testify in the
face of state evidentiary restrictions, and then extended this right
to the realm of hypnotically refreshed testimony.• In so doing,
however, the Court ignored crucial factors that differentiated Rock
from Washington and Chambers. In light of these factors, it is clear
that Washington and Chambers do not support the Court's holding.
Underlying Washington is the rationale that when a criminal
defendant's right to present a defense is at stake, a state may not
attempt to ensure the reliability of testimony through the use of
categorical, arbitrary rules of disqualification. 152
 Rather, the Wash-
ington Court stated that it is far more preferable to hear the testi-
mony of all material witnesses, and then to rely upon cross-exami-
nation and cautionary instructions to assist the jury in weighing the
testimony's creclibility.' 53 Underlying Chambers is the rationale that
a state court may not utilize mechanistic, absolute rules of exclusion
to limit a defense' witness's testimony, provided that such testimony
bears "persuasive assurances of trustworthiness" and is critical to
the defense.' 54
The Washington Court's proposition that the truth is best arrived
at when all material witnesses are allowed to testify, and the jury,
relying upon cross-examination and cautionary instructions, is al-
lowed to weigh their credibility, is not operative when a witness is
relating hypnotically refreshed recollections. When an ordinary wit-
ness takes the stand, a jury is able to make determinations as to the
witness's credibility. A jury ideally takes into consideration the man-
ner in which the witness relates his or her testimony. For example,
a jury will notice whether a witness is confident and sure of his or
her recollections or, rather, is wavering and doubtful. The degree
to which a witness's testimony is impeached through cross-exami-
nation will influence a jury. Cautionary instructions, which the judge
may offer, may also affect a jury's deliberations. In sum, a jury
1511 id .
151 hi. at 2710-11. 2714.
l"See.ttipra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
155 Id .
Chambers, 410  U.S. 284, 302 (1973); see supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
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ideally will factor all of these considerations into its final calculus
and then determine the weight to be given a witness's testimony.
In contrast, when a witness relates hypnotically refreshed tes-
timony, this process is not possible. A person under hypnosis is not
only extremely receptive to suggestions, 155
 but also experiences a
compelling desire to please the hypnotist,' 56 and is prone to create
memories.' 57 Absent independent corroboration, a factfinder can-
not determine whether hypnotically refreshed memories are fact or
fiction. Neither the detail nor plausibility of such recollections are
at all probative of their truthfulness.'" Furthermore, a witness will
be convinced that his or her hypnotically refreshed memories are
assuredly correct, and this confidence will grow stronger each time
the subject repeats his or her recollections.'" Thus, no one, not
even the world's foremost experts on hypnosis, can determine if a
particular hypnotically refreshed recollection is true or false.' 6°
Consequently, a jury will not be able to judge the credibility of
hypnotically refreshed testimony as it can ordinary testimony.' 6 '
The witness will exude great confidence in detailed and plausible
testimony; as a result, an opposing attorney will not be able to cross-
examine a hypnotically refreshed witness as effectively as he or she
would an ordinary witness.' 62
 The danger also exists that juries will
not heed a judge's cautionary instructions which detail the dangers
155 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
3 " See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
'" See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
35" See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
"ia See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
161 In Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
However, at this time, we remain unconvinced that the trier of fact could do
anything more than speculate as to the accuracy and reliability of hypnotically-
refreshed memory. The Hurd court's rationale that hypnotically-refreshed rec-
ollection might as well be admissible since ordinary eyewitness accounts are also
vulnerable to error and inaccuracies does not do full justice to the fact that the
traditional guaranties of trustworthiness as well as the jury's ability to view the
demeanor of the witness are wholly ineffective to reveal distortions of memory
induced by the hypnotic process.'
496 Pa. 97, 109, 436 A.2d 170, 176-77 (1981) (quoting Note, Probative Value of Testimony from
the Hypnotically Refreshed Recollection, 14 AKRON L. Ray. 609, 615 (1981)).
1 ' 52 In State v. Peoples, the North Carolina Supreme Court wrote: "In short, hypnosis
not only irrevocably masks whether a subject's recall induced by it is true, it also creates a
barrier to the ascertainment of the truthfulness through cross-examination — that method
normally relied on in the courtroom to test the truthfulness of testimony." 311 N.C. 515,
523, 319 S.E.2d 177, 182 (1984),
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of hypnotically refreshed testimony, but instead, will view hypnosis
as a type of truth serum and thus accord undue credibility to
hypnotically refreshed testimony.' 65
 In sum, the traditional devices
upon which our system relies to ensure trustworthy testimony are
ineffectual when applied to hypnotically refreshed testimony.'"
Thus, the rationale underlying Washington does not support the
Court's holding in Rock.
Furthermore, the Chambers Court held that the evidence in
question must bear "persuasive assurances of trustworthiness." 165
Juries cannot possibly determine whether particular hypnotically
refreshed testimony bears any assurances of trustworthiness. Hyp-
notically refreshed testimony leaves no clues. Consequently juries
cannot possibly determine whether the testimony bears any assur-
ances of trustworthiness.
By mandating that trial judges conduct a case-by-case balancing
test, weighing a criminal defendant's constitutional right to testify
against the unreliability of the hypnotically refreshed testimony, the
United States Supreme Court is, in effect, ordering trial court
judges to do the impossible. Although trial judges make balancing
determinations everyday, the balancing test the Supreme Court
mandated in Rock differs from the ordinary balancing test because
the Rock test forces judges to make a balancing determination with
only one scale. The essence of a balancing test is that two distinct
entities or concerns are weighed against one another. The balancing
test that the Rock Court created supposedly weighs a criminal de-
fendant's constitutional right to testify against the unreliability of
the particular hypnotically refreshed testimony in question. A trial
judge can weigh a criminal defendant's constitutional right to testify,
but when the trial judge attempts to weigh the unreliability of the
particular hypnotically refreshed testimony, however, he or she can-
not do so — hypnotically refreshed testimony cannot be weighed.' 66
There are no indicators which a trial judge may use to make a
logical, reasoned determination regarding the unreliability of par-
,63
 Brown v, State , 426 So. 2d 76,84-85 (Fla. App. 1983); Peoples, 311 N.C. at 526-27,
319 S.E.2d at 184.
11',
 The North Carolina Supreme Court in Peoples stated: "The problem with hypnotically
refreshed testimony lies not so much with the fallibility of the human witness but with the
defects in the hypnotic process itself which cannot be compensated for by the ordinary trial
process." 311 N.C. at 529,319 S.E.2d at 185.
•	 '"' Chambers, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
1 m See ,supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
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titular hypnotically refreshed testimony. In sum, the Supreme
Court is ordering trial court judges to make scientific determina-
tions regarding the reliability of particular hypnotically refreshed
testimony, determinations that the foremost experts on hypnotically
refreshed testimony in the country are unable to make. In short,
the Supreme Court is farting trial judges to make legal determi-
nations based solely on pure speculation.
In summary, hypnotically refreshed testimony presents a novel
problem because such testimony is immune to our trial system's
methods of determining credibility. Hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony does not fit into the traditional truth-seeking machinery that
our courts have set in place over the years. Given its ability to elude
naturally such protections, hypnotically refreshed testimony is thus
a very real threat to our truth-seeking process. As such, until science
discovers the capability to determine the accuracy of hypnotically
refreshed testimony, it should not be admitted at trial. This sug-
gestion is not as draconian as it appears. A previously hypnotized
witness will always be able to testify to that which he or she recalled
prior to undergoing hypnosis. Moreover, each and every previously
hypnotized witness placed himself or herself in that position. They
chose to be hypnotized. Thus, a rule that excludes hypnotically
refreshed testimony on a per se basis is not penalizing a witness for
being in a predicament over which he or she exercised no control.
In sum, the exclusion of hypnotically refreshed testimony on a per
se basis is necessary to preserve the integrity of our truth-seeking
process.
V. CONCLUSION
In Rock v. Arkansas, the United States Supreme Court addressed
the question of the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony
for the first time, holding that Arkansas's per se exclusion of hyp-
notically refreshed testimony impermissibly infringed upon a crim-
inal defendant's right to testify on his or her own behalf. The Court
ruled that, when a criminal defendant's fourteenth, sixth, and fifth
amendment rights to testify are at stake, courts must use a case-by-
case balancing test, weighing a criminal defendant's constitutional
right to testify against the unreliability of the hypnotically refreshed
testimony. The Court expressly limited its holding to the hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony of criminal defendants only; the opinion,
however, clearly opens the doors of admissibility to the hypnotically
refreshed testimony of material criminal defense witnesses. Fur-
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thermore, the opinion does not rest upon firm pragmatic and legal
ground, as the Court ignored the special dangers that hypnotically
refreshed testimony presents to our truth-seeking process. In sum,
the holding in Rack v. Arkansas poses serious threat to the integrity
of our trial process.
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